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Abstract
While it is not uncommon for humanitarian organiza-
tions, such as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), to implement information campaigns about 
forced migrant rights, the assistance available to them, and 
options for the future, these eff orts oft en meet unintended 
consequences. Forced migrants have, at times, rejected, 
misinterpreted, and condemned the information they get 
from these sources. Th is paper argues that offi  cial infor-
mation campaigns oft en falter for two crucial reasons 
beyond resource scarcity. First, those agencies disseminat-
ing information are oft en under pressure to curb the out-
fl ow of migrants from the Global South, and as a result, 
information provision has tended to be coloured by eff orts 
to control or protect against forced migrants’ movement 
or desires. Second, these agencies do not typically con-
sider or engage with migratory capital, including migrants’ 
informal networks for sharing knowledge about the migra-
tory process. As a case study, this paper relies on qualita-
tive interviews and focus groups with Iraqis displaced in 
Jordan to explore their lived experiences vis-à-vis both the 
offi  cial information from humanitarian agencies and their 
informal networks that are transnational in nature.
Résumé
Alors qu’il n’est pas rare que les organisations humanitai-
res, telles que le Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies 
pour les réfugiés (UNHCR), mettent en place des cam-
pagnes d’information sur les droits des migrants forcés, 
l’aide accessible et leurs options d’avenir, on constate que 
ces eff orts ont souvent des conséquences inattendues. En 
eff et, ces migrants peuvent à certains moments rejeter, 
mal interpréter, et condamner l’information qu’on leur 
donne. Cet article montre que ces campagnes d’infor-
mation échouent principalement pour deux importantes 
raisons, qui dépassent de loin le manque de ressources. 
Premièrement, les agences qui transmettent l’information 
travaillent souvent sous la pression qu’elles ont de freiner 
le nombre de migrants de l’hémisphère sud, avec la consé-
quence que l’information se trouve déformée par l’inten-
tion sous-jacente de contrôler les mouvements et désirs des 
migrants forcés. Deuxièmement, ces agences ne prennent 
pas en compte le capital migratoire, incluant les réseaux 
informels des migrants qui se transmettent leur connais-
sance du processus migratoire. L’étude de cas que consti-
tue cet article se base sur une série d’entrevues qualitatives 
et de groupes de discussion avec des Irakiens réfugiés en 
Jordanie, afi n d’explorer leurs expériences face, à la fois, 
à l’information fournie par les agences humanitaires et à 
celles obtenues à travers leurs réseaux informels et qui sont 
en soi transnationaux.
Introduction
In the context of humanitarian intervention, safeguarding 
the basic human rights of forced migrants requires the dis-
semination of information about their rights, the assistance 
available to them, and options for the future.1 United Nations 
bodies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Inter-Agency Standing 
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Committee (IASC), recognize “the right to seek, receive and 
impart information” for all individuals, including forced 
migrants.2 Th ese agencies also promote the widespread 
dissemination of information because of their regard for 
human dignity and because they see information sharing 
as a means to build trust and respect with refugees.3 “Th e 
more information shared with refugees about issues of con-
cern to them,” states UNHCR, “the more involved, engaged 
and empowered they will be.”4 Stemming from this position 
are numerous “information campaigns,” where UN agen-
cies charged with providing humanitarian assistance create 
or support such informational initiatives as radio programs, 
television spots, cultural performances, education pro-
grams, and—perhaps most commonly—posters and leafl ets, 
all with the purpose of informing refugees about available 
services and options for their future.5
Despite such eff orts, these agencies transmit little con-
crete information about temporary or permanent solutions 
to forced migrants’ displacement, and their campaigns lead 
to unintended consequences in countries of fi rst asylum as 
forced migrants have, at times, rejected, misinterpreted, and 
condemned the information they get from international 
humanitarian agencies. Instead of feeling empowered, 
forced migrants have felt disenfranchised and objectifi ed, 
increasingly desperate at the uncertainty of their situa-
tion.6 Scholars have noted the cyclical nature of mistrust in 
contexts of displacement; agency staff  and forced migrants 
become more suspicious of one another’s intentions as both 
groups clash over the allocation of limited resources.7
Th is paper argues that offi  cial information campaigns 
oft en falter for two crucial reasons beyond resource scarcity. 
First, supra-state agencies charged with the protection and 
assistance of refugees fi nd themselves torn between this 
mandate and pressure from state governments to curb the 
fl ow of migrants from sending countries, particularly those 
in the Global South.8 As a result, UNHCR has explicitly 
framed its commitment to information provision as a tool 
to encourage displaced persons to stay in or return to their 
home country9 and the agency has developed global proto-
cols that refl ect a need to protect against the inherent pres-
sure of forced migrants wishing to resettle to the Global 
North.10 Second, agencies typically fail to give attention 
to migrants’ informal networks for sharing knowledge 
about the migratory process. Far from passively waiting 
for offi  cial word from state or supra-state agencies, forced 
migrants actively rely on their own networks to compre-
hend their options, and the knowledge in these networks 
oft en contradicts the “offi  cial story.” Th is article seeks to 
address both of these assertions through a case study of 
Iraqis displaced in Jordan negotiating with state and supra-
state bureaucracies, their own insecure circumstances, and 
their transnational networks of informal information to 
decide their next step.
Th e fi rst part of the article argues for consideration of 
transnational migratory capital, particularly in terms of 
knowledge construction, as the key for the transmission 
and reception of crucial information forced migrants use 
to make decisions about the future. Th e second part out-
lines the history of Iraqi displacement in recent decades, 
followed by a presentation of methods used in this study. 
Th e next part explores how respondents experience both 
offi  cial information and the informal knowledge of their 
transnational networks in a context of vulnerability and 
insecurity.
Migratory Capital, Information Provision, and 
Iraqis as Transmigrants
To date, there is little research about the relation between 
offi  cial information programs and informal networks for 
the exchange of knowledge in contexts of displacement. 
Khalid Koser highlights the extent to which information 
constitutes a key element in forced migrants’ decisions 
about repatriation. Focusing on knowledge communicated 
informally between refugees, Koser describes a trajectory 
beginning with the initial displacement when little infor-
mation is available followed by fl oods of rumours as the 
displaced population increases, and, fi nally, the establish-
ment of durable social and kin-based networks for informa-
tion exchange. Koser notes that refugees evaluate received 
information according to fl uid notions of the information 
transmitters’ trustworthiness and relevance.11 Amy West 
and Lydia Wambugu show how the tendency of humani-
tarian and state agencies to limit the quantity and quality 
of information reaching encamped forced migrants exacer-
bates the proliferation of informal information networks, 
which they consider dangerous because of the rumours they 
circulate. According to West and Wambugu, as one source 
of information becomes limited, another less reliable one 
proliferates. Critiquing the UN refugee agency and the gov-
ernment of Tanzania for restricting the fl ow of important 
information to forced migrants, they write, “their actions 
have created a parallel system, forcing refugees to view both 
as yet another threat to their survival, instead of legitimate 
guarantors of their security and well-being.”12 Such work 
challenges the notion that migrants are passive; that they do 
not employ a variety of resources to manage their circum-
stances. Yet even while focusing on agency among refugees, 
this work nevertheless depicts the fl ow of informal informa-
tion as largely erroneous, misleading, and correlated with 
formal information.
My study views the informal exchange of informa-
tion among migrants and between them and both their 
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communities of origin and offi  cial bodies as migratory 
capital reproduced and exchanged transnationally.13 Th is 
formulation leaves open the question of whether offi  cial or 
unoffi  cial sources constitute the most reliable information. 
Instead, I focus on exploring which information is most 
consequential for the decision-making process of forced 
migrants.
Originally considered as “the processes by which immi-
grants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that 
link together their societies of origin and settlement,”14 
transnationalism has, in recent years, called for a deterri-
torialization of relations across space.15 A range of factors 
associated with the contemporary political, social, and eco-
nomic landscape push and pull relationships beyond nation-
state boundaries so that they are fl exibly rooted in trans-
national social fi elds.16 As such, transnational networks are 
conduits for the global fl ow of knowledge and resources, 
both material and virtual, and they lead to the formation of 
logics that are more transnational than national.17
Part of what causes transnational elasticity is the broad 
impact of supra-state governance structures, economic and 
political multilateral collectivities intimately connected 
to the fact that there are currently over 30 million people 
stateless or displaced18 and millions more undocumented 
migrants whose lives are regulated by entities of global 
governance as well as authoritarian and liberal democratic 
states.19 Within migrant populations, there are many who 
are regularly or repeatedly on the move by varying degrees 
of choice and coercion.20 As many migrants in precarious 
circumstances fi nd themselves “thrown out of the family of 
nations,”21 repeated displacement over time requires them 
to depend on and further construct circuits of information, 
resources, and contacts formed over generations of group 
migration.22 Th ese networks span communities of origin, 
locales of displacement, and occasionally new commun-
ities of long-term settlement.23 Forced migrants must rely 
more completely upon their accumulated collective migra-
tory capital,24 that is “knowledge of how to go about migra-
tion, how to deal with brokers, traffi  ckers, border offi  cials 
and bureaucrats, how to develop and maintain contacts in 
receiving countries, and how to fi nd accommodation, secure 
social security entitlements or gain employment.”25 Th us, it 
is important to focus on the ways in which such individuals 
“fi nd in mobility a resource, not only a constraint”; on the 
ways in which “an initially imposed dispersion is turned to 
advantage.”26 Adopting this perspective, this paper gives 
attention to the ways in which displaced persons discuss 
their utilization of the socio-cultural resources they mobil-
ize in response to exile.27
Addressing questions of how the regulation of offi  cial 
information relates to the management of the migrant 
population, Dorothy Smith asserts that institutional know-
ledge serves as a tool of governance.28 Smith distinguishes 
between two forms of knowledge. First, the knowledge of 
the local and the particular is knowledge generated through 
experience. Th e notion of “local” here is taken to be not 
necessarily a spatial reference, but rather an exchange 
between and among individuals and collectivities of experi-
ential accounts. Second, the objectifi ed knowledge of the 
“extra-local” is that which has been abstracted from lived 
experience to be useful on an institutional and administra-
tive level.29 As such, objectifi ed knowledge subjugates the 
knowledge of the local and the experienced as irrelevant, 
chaotic, or even dangerous. To Smith, the governing pro-
cesses of society construct a knowledge for the purpose of 
management and control in which “issues are formulated 
because they are administratively relevant, not because 
they are signifi cant fi rst in the experience of those who live 
them.”30 Such processes “eliminate the presence of subjects 
as agents.”31
In terms of migration, offi  cial information consists of the 
knowledge of migrants’ experience objectifi ed through pro-
cesses of institutional assessment of migrants’ claims. Th ese 
offi  cial assessments subject the lived experience of migrants 
to multiple levels of bureaucratic analysis of criteria for 
refugee status and resettlement to Global North nation-
states. To be deemed a refugee—and one eligible for resettle-
ment—is contingent on the ways in which nation-state and 
supra-state actors categorize migrants’ lived experience on 
an institutional level.32 When Iraqi forced migrants look 
toward the agencies and organizations regulating resettle-
ment for information, they are in a sense attempting to 
learn how their lived experiences have been or may be cat-
egorized into offi  cial knowledge, what this implies for their 
future and, for those intent on resettling, how they can best 
account for their lived experience in order to end up cat-
egorized as “eligible.”
Th e Context of Iraqi Displacement in Jordan
Chatelard has written on the establishment and mainten-
ance of networks among Iraqi forced migrants who have 
experienced multiple waves of displacement.33 She refers 
to Amman and Baghdad as “translocal spaces,” in which 
individuals have moved and continue to move between the 
two locales to conduct business and politics, attend school, 
and visit hospitals among other activities.34 Iraqis have long 
included Jordan as a destination for translocality or merely 
for transit.35 Large-scale forced migration has taken place 
primarily since the mid-1990s in the aft ermath of the fi rst 
Gulf War and subsequent sanctions.36 Th ere were believed 
to be between 250,000 and 350,000 Iraqis in Jordan by 
2003.37
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Th e outpouring over the last seven years of forced 
migrants from Iraq into neighbouring countries consti-
tutes one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. Th ere 
are believed to be fi ve million displaced Iraqis, about half 
of whom fl ed beyond the borders of their country and a 
portion of whom were displaced over previous decades.38 
While the total number of Iraqi forced migrants in Jordan is 
heavily debated, there are approximately 60,000 registered 
with UNHCR,39 while there are more than 200,000 regis-
tered in Syria and an additional 10,000 in Lebanon.40 It is 
believed that tens of thousands more are unregistered in 
each country.41 Beyond these numbers are several thousand 
more who have used neighbouring countries as places of 
transit before migrating elsewhere.42 For the last four years, 
Iraqis have constituted the largest group of asylum seekers 
in industrialized countries.43 However, the journey to seek 
asylum in the European Union and elsewhere is oft en a dan-
gerous one ending in detention and deportation, directly or 
ultimately to Iraq.44
Jordan as a Vulnerability Context
Jordan—and the other fi rst countries of asylum—consti-
tutes what has been termed a “vulnerability context,”45 in 
which host country laws and policies, public and private 
refugee support networks, and broader public attitudes 
toward forced migrants lead to particular sets of opportun-
ities and constraints for the refugee communities. In urban 
settings, such as Amman or Damascus, the vulnerability 
context is contingent on both forced migrants’ legal status 
and their access to livelihoods.46 During a 2009 evaluation, 
UNHCR determined that the primary constraints for the 
Iraqi forced migrant population consisted of punishments 
for violations of immigration policy, refoulement (forced 
return to a context of persecution), a lack of access to health 
and education services, limited fi nancial resources/employ-
ment, and relations with the host country.47 Additional 
assessments have identifi ed gender as an important variable 
for determining this population’s vulnerability.48
Th e legal rights of Iraqis displaced in Jordan remain 
highly limited, despite advocacy on their behalf by rights-
based organizations.49 Residency and legal employment 
remain signifi cant challenges. In May 2008, the Jordanian 
government issued new visa rules requiring Iraqis to 
obtain Jordanian visas from Iraq before arriving at the bor-
der.50 Visa and livelihood expenses are diffi  cult to pay for 
those with dwindling fi nancial resources, especially since 
the Jordanian government has continued to prohibit the 
employment of Iraqi forced migrants without residency and 
work permits. Th ere are many Iraqis in Jordan without resi-
dency who work in the informal economy, but they are oft en 
subject to poor working conditions, arbitrary dismissal, 
and deportation by Jordanian security offi  cials.51 And while 
Iraqi school-aged children are now permitted to attend 
Jordanian public schools and while Iraqis have access to 
Jordan’s health-care system, the diffi  cult fi nancial situation 
has led to debt, exploitation in the informal economy, and 
unhealthy living conditions.52
A study by Fafo, the Norwegian research centre, found 
that in 2007 approximately 20 percent of households were 
female-headed and these were concentrated among the 
poorer households. Other studies have pointed to increased 
instances of sexual abuse and exploitation and domestic 
abuse against women as a result of displacement.53 Despite 
this, Iraqi women have been found to be more resilient than 
men in fi rst countries of asylum.54 Finally, Sassoon high-
lights that many Jordanians see the infl ux of Iraqis to be 
causally related to greater infl ation, higher housing prices, 
and the undercutting of Jordanian wages. Th is has led to 
widespread public resentment of the Iraqi forced migrant 
population.55
On the international level, the humanitarian commun-
ity has responded to this most recent Iraqi refugee crisis 
by establishing a protection and assistance regime. Th is 
comes in the form of cash assistance, the provision of non-
food items, psychosocial counseling, vocational training, 
community development, refugee status determination, 
and resettlement. As Iraqis continue to fl ow in and out of 
countries of fi rst asylum and as assistance programs grow 
or shrink according to donor priorities and resources, con-
cerns about the future are increasingly becoming a source of 
tension and desperation.
Resettlement and the UN’s Policy on Information 
Provision
Each country of resettlement has its own criteria upon 
which it relies to screen Iraqis. UNHCR considers these cri-
teria and makes referrals of individual cases to the appro-
priate countries. Currently the international community 
considers resettlement the primary viable solution for Iraqi 
refugees; the governments of neighbouring countries do not 
permit formal integration into their societies and only rela-
tively small numbers have offi  cially returned to Iraq.56 Since 
2007, UNHCR has referred approximately 82,000 Iraqi refu-
gees from the region to 17 diff erent countries, including the 
United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden.57 Th e United States has taken the bulk of those 
resettled, approximately 19,000 in 2009.58
When it comes to decisions about resettlement, UNHCR 
stresses that the whole process should be “transparent vis-
à-vis refugees.”59 To this end, “information meetings may 
be held to inform refugees and resettlement partners of the 
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standards and procedures governing the resettlement pro-
cess in a given Field Offi  ce.”60
However, UNHCR also stresses the need to manage 
expectations:
With limited information about the nature and limitations of 
resettlement as a durable solution, refugees may develop unreal-
istic expectations about resettlement. Such expectations could 
potentially result in increased desperation on the part of refugees 
and excessive pressures on an [UNHCR] Offi  ce, and eventually 
undermine the resettlement process as a whole.61
Th e latter reveals a fundamental paradox in UNHCR’s 
guidelines: their desire to empower and protect the free-
doms of refugees is tempered by an awareness that uncon-
trolled, forced migrants will damage the very resettlement 
process set up to help them. On some level, protection 
entails “guarding” refugees from themselves. In this sense, 
information provision should reduce unrealistic expecta-
tions. Th us, there may be certain offi  cial knowledge or 
experiential information about the migratory process that 
should be kept from migrants, in the name of protecting 
migrants as well as the staff  and mission of UNHCR. For 
example, state and UN agencies have articulated their need 
to manage refugee expectations in terms of “shopping,” i.e., 
the search for the asylum or resettlement site with the best 
resources.62 Of course, there may also be some questions 
from forced migrants to which UNHCR simply does not 
have the answer. UNHCR and others have noted that they 
are frequently inundated by phone and in-person queries 
from Iraqis.63 An escalation of requests or demands could 
make it more diffi  cult for UNHCR to manage the displaced 
group, given limited resources.
Additionally, while UNHCR resettlement policy states 
that the refugee or whoever referred her or him to UNHCR 
“should be notifi ed in writing that the refugee will not be 
considered for resettlement,”64 when it comes to granting 
an individual case access to her or his fi le, UNHCR also 
notes in an internal document:
UNHCR needs to weigh its own interests (such as staff  safety con-
siderations or protection of UNHCR’s sources of information) 
against the [refugee’s] legitimate interest, for instance, to know 
the reasons for any decision that aff ects her or him.
Such a guideline may be understandable and appropriate; 
however, in the context of Iraqi displacement, UNHCR’s 
decision to withhold this key information from those Iraqi 
forced migrants who will not be referred for resettlement 
has led many within this population to react in unantici-
pated ways.
Methods
Th is article is based on semi-structured interviews and 
focus groups conducted during the summer of 2009 and 
spring of 2010 with 25 Iraqis displaced in Jordan, a purpos-
ive sample from a larger n of approximately 60 Iraqis who 
participated in a broader study focused on resettlement and 
information. Th is research represents the co-construction 
of knowledge between researcher and the researched. Given 
my position as a Global North researcher working in Jordan 
among displaced populations, participants and I were aware 
of the vast asymmetry that lay between us. Th is challenges 
concepts of consent and threatens to render the interview 
a reproduction of unequal power relations.65 I conducted 
this fi eldwork not only for academic research, but also for 
an NGO concerned with international policy on resettle-
ment for Iraqi forced migrants; research participants were 
informed of this dual purpose. As somebody working with 
an NGO and conducting empirical research, I acknowledge 
that while negotiating the “activist-scholar divide,” my 
study refl ects a dual imperative: my interest in conducting 
an academically rigorous study and my commitment to 
action research.66
Of the 25 research participants, 13 participated in in-
depth, open-ended interviews, while 12 participated in focus 
group discussions. Ten focus group discussions were con-
ducted for the larger study. A slight majority of participants 
were women (52 percent; n=13). Forty percent (n=10) of the 
participants were between 18 and 30, 56 percent (n=14) were 
between 30 and 50, and one participant was 64. All research 
participants are Iraqi nationals, though they diff er in terms 
of their place of origin; a majority of participants were from 
Baghdad. Close to 65 percent of participants came from a 
middle-class socio-economic background with professions 
like engineer and teacher, while the remainder were from 
working-class backgrounds and had had jobs in Iraq such as 
mechanic and vendor. Th is study did not measure religious 
or sectarian breakdown among participants for a variety 
of reasons,67 though it is important to note that accord-
ing to a 2007 survey, 60 percent of the Iraqi households in 
Jordan are Sunni, 18 percent are Shiite, 15 percent percent 
are Christian, and 5 percent are those that follow other 
religious traditions, particularly Sabean and Yedizis.68 As 
a purposive sample, participants were recruited from the 
community centres and reception rooms at international 
humanitarian NGOs in Amman and one Jordanian com-
munity-based organization located in Baqa’a, a Palestinian 
refugee camp 20 kilometres outside of Amman. Th us, 20 
out of 25 participants came from urban parts of Jordan.69 
Visiting Jordan several times between June 2009 and July 
2010, I was able to recruit respondents in three iterations 
according to the themes emerging from initial analyses 
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of my data, a partial theoretical sample;70 partial because 
iterative recruitment was constrained by my limited visits 
during which I had to meet the goals of the NGO for which 
I worked. All the names of respondents have been changed 
to pseudonyms. Interviews were conducted in Arabic with 
English interpretation in private within the offi  ces of the 
organizations where recruitment took place. An interview 
guide was produced in English, translated into Arabic, and 
then checked for linguistic equivalence.
In analyzing interview and focus group transcripts, I 
conducted line-by-line and focused coding to build induct-
ive and interpretive theoretical assertions that stem from 
my understanding of participants’ explanations of lived 
experiences.71 Th is form of analysis refl ects the initial cod-
ing stages of a more constructivist version of the grounded 
theory method upon which I relied in designing and 
developing this research. Despite this reliance on construc-
tivism in my design and interviewing processes the current 
research does not include the development of a new theory 
per se.72 I also, less subjectively, analyzed thematic codes 
to locate respondents’ voices within the vulnerability con-
text discussed above in order to highlight how this study’s 
respondents are situated in relation to the literature (see 
Table 1).73 Th is should not be confl ated with respondents’ 
articulation of their perceptions of vulnerability.
Migrant Experiences with Offi  cial Information and 
Local Knowledge
Initial and focused coding yielded specifi c analytical themes. 
Codes clustered around the topics of trust, security, and 
options for the future in terms of institutional and offi  cial 
sources of information and participants’ own reliance on 
and contribution to local, experiential knowledge. Analysis 
reveals that migrants’ experience with uncertainty, real or 
perceived insecurity, and their mistrust of the institutions 
regulating migration are all interconnected. Th e fi rst part 
of this section deals with the connection between being in 
a vulnerability context and the ways in which Iraqis experi-
ence offi  cial sources of information. Second, I examine how 
the respondents’ ability to rely on networks of experiential 
knowledge relate to their context and their perception of 
offi  cial information.
Insecurity, Vulnerability, and Experiences with Offi  cial 
Information
Sixty percent of the research participants who noted a lack 
of access to information had also experienced a range of 
diffi  culties in Jordan from abuse and deportation to over-
crowded and unhealthy living situations and limited access 
to healthcare. Table 1 illustrates the factors contributing to 
a sense of insecurity, highlighting several of the indicators 
noted in the previous section. While the table reports cer-
tain indicators related to gender, information about female 
participants’ experiences with sexual and domestic abuse 
and exploitation is not available due to methodological 
constraints.
As the table indicates, many of the participants, both 
women and men, experience economic hardship in Jordan. 
While this table is not intended to be representative of the 
Iraqi forced migrant population in general,74 it relates to 
the factors of a vulnerability context mentioned above and 
it frames a context in which they interpreted their experi-
ences trying to access offi  cial sources of information.
Eighty percent of participants described using or 
attempting to get offi  cial information, oft en in the form 
of details about their status, the structure of the resettle-
ment process, or conditions in resettlement states. During 
interviews, research participants shared their experiences 
trying to get in touch with UN or other agency offi  ces. Th e 
more participants portrayed their interactions with offi  cial 
sources of information, the clearer it became that these 
experiences were infl uenced by and also heightened their 
sense of insecurity.
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Table 1: Indicators of Insecurity
Indicators % Participants Male Female
Financial resource/employment
Unhealthy living 
conditions
32 4 4
Debt 40 6 4
Overcrowded housing 32 2 6
Below the Jordanian 
poverty linea
36 3 6
Labour exploitation 8 1 1
Health
Physical health 
problems
24 2 4
Gender
Female-headed 
household
20 5
Single female below 
poverty line
16 4
Gender (other)b 8 2
Relations with host community
Problems with 
neighbours
20 2 3
Immigration/legal status
Deportation 0 0 0
Police harassment 12 3
 a. According to USAID, the poverty line in Jordan is USD $439 per capita annual 
income.
 b. Th is category refers to a range of gender-related issues which respondents 
faced and that indicate their vulnerability, such as generalized disenfranchise-
ment in decision-making as a result of one’s gender.
As 27-year-old Jaber noted:
When I go to meet with the social counselor [at UNHCR], she 
says that she doesn’t know where my fi le is and that I need to call 
by phone if I want to fi nd out something related to my status. But 
when I call, they keep me on hold forever, like an hour, transfer-
ring me from one person to the next, until I run out of phone 
credit. And then that’s that.
Forty-nine-year-old Nadia, who has been living in Jordan 
for two years, also felt that the environment at UNHCR 
is less conducive to information sharing and more about 
information extraction:
I would like that everything can be made more clear. My last 
interview was like an argument. Th ey said they didn’t know any-
thing and we said that we needed to know the information. It is 
like an investigation—they just take notes and say that they need 
to know this and that, but what is the use of this information?
Such excerpts from across the sample of participants 
construct a narrative of inaccessible and unwelcoming insti-
tutions; even if such institutions truly do not “know any-
thing,” the context is one of such extreme insecurity that 
it is impossible for some participants to believe no answer 
exists to questions regarding their future. Other comments 
refl ect the notion that while these institutions do give out 
some information, it is not tailored to meet migrants’ needs. 
As 30-year-old Saphir put it:
Th e only information we are getting from the UN is from the bro-
chures and from the advertising and other than that we don’t have 
any kind of information. If we need to ask, we can’t ask, we are 
only getting … getting … we are only getting information that 
they want us to have, not what we are asking about.
Th e brochures mentioned here are informational pamph-
lets about services available to Iraqis in Jordan and about 
repatriation. Several of the research participants had seen 
the larger posters or pamphlets distributed by UNHCR 
regarding fi nancial support for those who wish to return to 
Iraq. However, as 33-year-old Sharin explains it, this infor-
mation is only partial:
I read about assistance for repatriation. I read that the UN will 
give $100 for people volunteering to go back. I also heard this 
while waiting at Caritas. I heard that it is $100 per person and 
the family will get no more than $500.00. I’ve not heard anything 
about what happens to people who go back.
For some, like Nadia who attended information sessions, 
receiving institutional details was only secondary to the fact 
that “I just want to know where my fi le is—this uncertainty 
means I don’t know what my life will be like two months 
from now.”
For 28-year-old Ahmed, it is his tenuous ability to remain 
in Jordan that causes him anxiety because of what he fears 
in Iraq:
I heard that for my process [with the UN] I need to present docu-
ments, which I did. Also if I received some death threats, I need 
to show the paper which the threat was written on or I need to 
show photos that prove my situation. I presented my case three 
years ago and haven’t gotten anywhere. In the meantime a year 
and a half ago my uncle was murdered in Iraq. Two months ago, 
my other uncle was murdered. I got the death certifi cate for this 
to prove it. But now they are sending death threats for my father. 
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I gave all of this information to UNHCR but I still haven’t heard 
anything from them.
Ahmed had been receiving cash assistance from one 
humanitarian organization in Jordan before their pro-
gram ended and as a result this form of support evapor-
ated. Unable to work, in debt, and with no income from 
remittances, Ahmed lost his apartment and moved into an 
empty offi  ce building where he lived without a bathroom or 
kitchen.
In this state of insecurity, Ahmed expressed frustration 
at the international community. “I didn’t receive any infor-
mation about anything,” he said. “No resettlement and no 
help. I get monthly assistance from the UN but that’s it and 
it’s not enough … I am hanging by a thread here.” Frustrated 
with this perceived silence and delay from the UN, Ahmed 
has frequently called and visited their offi  ces to get some 
further details about his case. “A year ago I contacted the 
UN and asked about my fi le and they said that it was under 
study,” he said. “A month ago they said the same thing … I 
want to know what the process is. What is the procedure? I 
just want a reply, yes or no. I feel devastated.”
It is the uncertainty in and of itself that causes Ahmed 
such stress as he refl ects on possible next steps:
I have defi nitely thought about going illegally. I know a lot of 
people who have been contacted by an individual saying that if 
given money they can give you a visa. If he comes and talks to 
me, I’ll go for it. Th ere is no other way and I can’t go back to Iraq.
Th is could include any manner of risky travel where, as 
mentioned above, migrants are oft en subject to exploita-
tion, theft , and abuse at the hands of smugglers, traffi  ckers, 
and government offi  cials they meet or upon which they rely 
along the way.
Th ese accounts refl ect the ways in which being in a 
“vulnerability context” is directly connected to a sense of 
insecurity, which in turn compounds frustration with these 
agencies’ perceived lack of transparency. Figure 1 illustrates 
this interconnection.
While these links are not causal, they refl ect the ways in 
which participants’ vulnerability and sense of insecurity 
relate to one another and to their experiences attempting 
to acquire offi  cial information. In Ahmed’s case, his initial 
state of vulnerability leads to a sense of insecurity, both of 
which colour his experience at the UNHCR offi  ce. In turn, 
his experiences at the UN—and his frustration with these 
experiences—heighten his sense of insecurity, which infl u-
ences his decision to migrate irregularly, an option that 
would drastically increase his vulnerability.
Mistrust and Negative Perceptions of Offi  cial Sources of 
Information
Participants demonstrate that their sense of insecurity also 
leads to a mistrust of the institutions regulating resettle-
ment and repatriation. Some consider institutional infor-
mation highly valid, but their situation has pushed them to 
question the role of the agencies providing protection and 
assistance. A number of participants felt a loss of trust pre-
cisely because of their lack of access to information. Feeling 
that institutions managing the resettlement process are 
withholding information, giving it only partially, or forsak-
ing their Iraqi benefi ciaries led many participants to label 
these agencies as untrustworthy:
We need to have a mechanism to give benefi ciaries information 
about their cases so that they will know what the timeline is 
for everything because the UN tells you sometimes that in nine 
months you will be in the United States, so … but you stay for 
a year and a half and nothing happens so you get worried about 
that. I know that they have a lot of pressure and a lot of refugees 
in Jordan and this makes a lot of work, but this is not … they need 
to explain their mechanism so people would relax a little bit and 
because … uh … it is not trustworthy anymore, we can’t depend 
on the information anymore.
In this excerpt, Saphir links the condition of uncer-
tainty and waiting—a condition shown above to be inter-
connected with vulnerability and insecurity—to a growing 
mistrust of the information that comes out of agencies such 
as UNHCR. During a focus group with four middle-aged 
Iraqi research participants, the following discussion builds 
on Saphir’s point:
Adam: What have been your experiences meeting offi  cials to talk 
about your options for the future?
Do’a: A lot of social workers and case managers came and asked 
us the same questions each time they met us. Th ey want details 
about us, but then nothing happens and we don’t get services. I 
Figure 1: Infl uential links aff ecting experiences
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feel tired out from all of this and if I could get something from 
this whole process if there is some benefi t, then let me see it, 
otherwise you are wasting my time.
Zaina: It’s not just about losing trust. It feels like there’s neglect 
of us. In general, Iraqis don’t have trust in the people we meet 
during our appointments and we don’t trust the information that 
is given to us.
At another point during the same focus group, the conversa-
tion returned to trust:
Abu Mohamed: When we go to the UN, nobody tells us the 
truth. Nobody answers our calls, or at least this is how it was a 
few months ago. Maybe it’s improved since then.
Doa’a: Right.
Om Noor: Right. Th ey just give us information to calm us down, 
they just give us useless information.
Doa’a: We want information about immigration.
Abu Mohamed: Yesterday I called UNHCR to ask about taking 
my son to the doctor and nobody answered. Th e operator was 
busy. I wanted to get the phone number for Caritas, but the 
person at UNHCR didn’t give me the information.
Here, participants associated a feeling of neglect with a 
sense of mistrust—an outcome of a collapse in the belief that 
these organizations would fulfi ll their purported commit-
ment to providing protection and/or assistance to migrants. 
Following his accusations of neglect and opaqueness, Abu 
Mohamed’s story in which UNHCR’s inaccessibility got in 
the way of his taking his son to the doctor refl ects the rela-
tionship between vulnerability and mistrust. Mistrust also 
stems from the perception that offi  cial institutions solicit 
information but do not give it or deliver on the promises 
that come implicitly with such inquiry. Finally, Om Noor 
appears angered at the notion that agencies use information 
as a tool to control and pacify Iraqis. Adding to Figure 1, 
Figure 2 illustrates the role of mistrust in this dynamic.
As this diagram shows, the mistrust participants 
expressed toward offi  cial sources of information is a result 
of their experiences with the institutions regulating resettle-
ment and return. However, the relationship is cyclical in 
that growing mistrust then colours subsequent experiences 
at state and supra-state agencies.
Ongoing Reliance on Local Knowledge Networks
Perhaps one of the largest factors shaping participants’ 
experiences with offi  cial sources of information is their use 
of local knowledge networks for co-constructing experi-
ential accounts of the migratory process. Th e term “local” 
here is adopted from Smith’s notion of “local knowledge,” 
mentioned above. Th ese networks exert an infl uence and 
are infl uenced by migrant perceptions of offi  cial institu-
tions. But, just like their perceptions of state and supra-state 
agencies, migrants’ use and perception of local knowledge 
networks are also subject to the pressures of an unstable 
situation. As Geraldine Chatelard asserts, Iraqi migrations 
are positioned along networks established and maintained 
through multiple waves of displacement.75 Iraqis migrat-
ing outwardly have maintained connections in Iraq, have 
diasporic relations with Iraqis in multiple parts of the world, 
engage in cross-border political activities, and—when con-
ditions allow—have travelled back and forth between homes 
in Iraq and abroad. Th ese transnational relations form com-
munication networks that serve as migratory capital for the 
exchange of local knowledge.
Th rough conversations with resettled refugees and 
Iraqis who have lived abroad for decades, Iraqis displaced 
in Jordan have a chance to hear fi rst-hand accounts of the 
life one faces abroad. Research participants described a reli-
ance on the stories told by other Iraqis going through the 
resettlement process in Jordan or Iraqis who have been to 
resettlement countries:
Adam: Where have you heard information about resettlement 
and repatriation?
Samir Hamdi: I heard from people who went already or those 
who have relatives there.
Sun: From people who have been there and described the 
situation.
Mai: My cousin has been living in America for four years. I got 
information from there.
Kalb Hazn: I got information from street talk. From a group of 
Iraqis. Th is is the only topic that we ever discuss.
Mohamed: I called two people who have resettled in diff erent 
Figure 2: Mistrust, information, and vulnerability
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states. One said that it is ok and the other said it is terrible; he is 
devastated. Generally I get information from the streets.
Samir Hamdi: Like when we visit homes, we talk about this.
Mai: We don’t go and ask IOM or UNHCR for information. 
You get information from there only aft er you are accepted for 
resettlement. Th ey have a class, but it is very vague and simple. 
And the information was very discouraging.
Participants gather local experiences in multiple ways. 
Mohamed locates his base of knowledge “on the streets.” 
Th is seems to be an analogy for informal sources on a local 
level, whether they are close in proximity or far away in other 
countries. Mai specifi es her reliance on relatives abroad for 
details about their experiences. In terms of questions about 
repatriation, Youssef put it:
My family in Iraq tells me that the best thing I did was to leave and 
keep my family safe. In terms of services, those who are already 
there do not get any services at all so how can there be services 
for you if you come back. It is better to stay away, even if it means 
being apart from your family. Th ings are worse than before with 
the US leaving. Th ings are upside down. Now that the US pulled 
out, there is no way to return.
In this case, his use of familial contacts in Iraq proves suf-
fi cient to discourage Youssef from returning at this time.
To some extent, these networks thrive on the humani-
tarian spaces provided by non-governmental organizations 
and international and state agencies:
Adam: So you hear from people who come from Iraq to Jordan 
and then how do you know these people?
Saphir: For two years I’ve worked with humanitarian 
organizations in Jordan. Of course from people who come to 
CARE and other organizations. Because anyone coming from 
Iraq was in a hurry and doesn’t have the money in order to 
live here in Jordan so they come here or to the United Nations. 
Directly, they go to UNHCR. Because of course these people 
will go to UNHCR and UNHCR will give them brochures and 
information about organizations that give services to Iraqi 
refugees, when they come to CARE or other organizations, I 
meet them and I hear the news from them. And Amman is a 
small city so people know each other. People go to organizations 
and meet each other. One tells the rest of the people information 
that he experienced in Iraq or if someone went to the USA and 
returned to Jordan he will tell people.
As Saphir explains, the physical spaces of international NGOs 
become impromptu locales for the exchange of experiential 
knowledge. As Iraqi forced migrants sit waiting in reception 
rooms, they have the opportunity to co-construct know-
ledge about options for the future. Th ese exchanges are 
more than just knowledge transactions. Forty-two-year-old 
Noor fi nds herself utterly alone in Jordan, having lost her 
husband and fi ve children to the confl ict in Iraq:
When you fi nd that you don’t have a country and you fi nd some-
body from your country, you like to gather with them to hear the 
language, to feel like you have a family and also to talk about 
immigration, IOM. We meet in the NGOs.
Th us displaced Iraqis have the opportunity to widen their 
social network, their migratory capital, and their commun-
ity support structures via the space of humanitarian organ-
izations. Research participants, like 33-year-old Moi, assert 
that these exchanges, which are established in the space 
of NGOs or refugee camps, turn into networks spanning 
geographical boundaries when contacts resettle or continue 
some other way onto the next step of their migration. Moi 
notes that he has friends all over North America and in 
Europe:
Adam: Where are some of the contacts you rely on for 
information?
Moi: America. Friends in the US. West Virginia, Pennsylvania. 
Also in Canada, my friend is there, and in England I have friends. 
Th ey are all friends, not relatives. Only my brother in the United 
States, in Pennsylvania. I call them and they call me. Th ey are 
from here. I know them from here. In Baqa’a, in Jordan. And 
from Jordan they go, they get resettled to the USA, to Canada, 
and to Europe and we stay in touch by phone.
Th e informal interactions taking place between Iraqis 
in humanitarian spaces are in a context in which offi  cial 
information is also available. Several international NGOs 
have recently set up “information centres” throughout 
Jordan primarily to further the proliferation of information 
about repatriation, though some focus on resettlement. Th e 
physical spaces in which this offi  cial information is avail-
able also remain ideal locales for the co-construction of 
local knowledge.
In addition, there are certain agency actors who may 
occasionally deviate from their duty to give only scripted 
information to Iraqi forced migrants. For 38-year-old Farah 
and her husband, the knowledge leaked from UNHCR staff  
was a deciding factor:
I asked a UN worker to explain what I might fi nd in America, 
whether the kids get monthly assistance. Th e answer was no, that 
neither we nor our kids get assistance. Th ey cover us for three 
months and then we are on our own. Aft er we heard that we felt 
down and started really thinking about not going… . Later we 
asked for our fi le to be pulled and when they asked us why we did 
that, we told them it was for fi nancial reasons.
Volume 28 Refuge Number 1
90
According to research participants, Iraqi forced migrants 
maintain local knowledge networks predominately through 
phone or in-person discussion. However, 12 percent of par-
ticipants (3 out of 25) reported relying on online networks 
to email contacts living outside of Jordan or participate in a 
web discussion forum for Iraqis:
Th is forum has information about people’s experience … Th ey tell 
their stories about what’s happened with them, what happened at 
the airport, what did the agency give them when they got to the 
airport, how much did they give them, about the food stamps and 
the medical thing … People from all countries, Lebanon, Syria, 
US, and Australia—all these kind of countries, they tell the stories 
about … how everything went with them and [they] explain it to 
people in the forum.
Insecurity, Mistrust, and Local Knowledge
Participants’ sense of insecurity and their mistrust of state 
and supra-state agencies infl uenced use of and contribu-
tions to the circulation of experiential knowledge. Research 
participants became acutely aware that refugee process-
ing involved textualizing lived experiences to render them 
measurable according to administrative and legal standards 
in part by relying on accounts heard from other displaced 
Iraqis.
For example, as 45-year-old Mara’a put it, “I have heard 
very strong rumors that if you lie and dramatize your story, 
then you will get resettled, but if you tell the truth then it is 
likely that they will reject you.” Echoing this, 47-year-old 
Youssef said:
Each case is diff erent. It depends on what happened for that per-
son in Iraq. But there are many people who present fake photos 
and CDs with videos or photos on them that illustrate persecution 
or death threats. Th ere are forged certifi cates of certain experi-
ences. It’s funny because the people who bring these forged docu-
ments and photos are the ones who get accepted for resettlement 
and they leave for America while a family with a son that has real 
documents and proof of his persecution will be stuck and will not 
get accepted.
Th is refl ects suspicion of both the institutions managing 
migration and of other Iraqis who seem to have commit-
ted fraud and succeeded. Th ese lines should also be read as 
signals of uncertainty; research participants searched for 
meaning in the fact that they may have been rejected from 
resettlement or forgotten about by humanitarian agencies 
despite having had—or continuing to have—life experi-
ences with insecurity that warrant a need for international 
protection. As much as these excerpts are accusations of a 
fraudulent resettlement process, they are also demonstra-
tions of how participants relied on others’ accounts as they 
formulated perceptions of their testimonies’ utility during 
the offi  cial and systematic processing of data on refugees.
Many of the stories shared by participants constitute 
hearsay about the resettlement process. Both personal 
accounts and stories passed along from person to person 
infl uenced participants. Participants also tended to rely on 
hearsay when it came to stories about projected insecurity. 
According to 39-year-old Sun,
I got through the process of resettlement. I did the procedures—I 
am waiting for the fi nal result but still hesitating. I don’t know 
if I should stay or go. I am terrifi ed of going … But I am scared 
that if I say no, the UN will take away my papers and I will have 
to go back to Iraq. My sister is in Sweden and they told me that I 
couldn’t go be with her. Th ey told me to just take my opportunity 
for resettlement or leave it.
In this case, Sun considers information from UNHCR, 
rumours and accounts from other Iraqis, and her own sense 
of insecurity as she tries to make up her mind. For some 
research participants, their growing mistrust of the insti-
tutions regulating migration is what leads them to favour 
experiential knowledge. As Saphir stated,
I know that on a personal level I don’t trust the information given 
from the UN and the IOM but the thing is that as a person I like 
more to get information from people with experience that … they 
got resettled and they went to the countries. Why? Because I 
imagine the path of my life and what is going to happen to me and 
Figure 3: Interaction between local knowledge & offi  cial 
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how everything will go. But that doesn’t mean that the informa-
tion that we have from the UN or IOM websites and all kind of 
resources is not important because it is. It is the formal kind of 
information and it is very important for the refugees. We have 
some kind of code in Arabic: “you can ask someone with experi-
ence and not ask the doctor” like we trust someone with experi-
ence more than we trust the doctor.
Despite recognizing that at times accounts from other Iraqis 
may not be accurate, Saphir refl ects, “I take them more ser-
iously because they may not be true 100%, but because they 
are real experiences.”
Th e cyclical relationship between living in a state of 
insecurity, experiences with offi  cial sources of informa-
tion, mistrust of these sources, and negotiating the local 
knowledge circulating among Iraqi forced migrants led to 
real consequences for several research participants. Sixteen 
percent of participants reported that they had declined an 
off er of resettlement in the recent past. In most cases, these 
decisions were made strategically to preserve or enhance 
physical or psychological security. As Doa’a’s words below 
indicate, these decisions were also oft en made based on 
experiential knowledge and hearsay, sources of information 
that are more trusted than those offi  cial locales:
I got accepted to the United States and I refused to go based on 
the information I got from a relative there. She told me that you 
only get 3 months of assistance and don’t get any help aft er that 
and you can’t survive.
To add to the model shown in Figures 1 and 2, Figure 3 
illustrates the link between vulnerability, insecurity, mis-
trust, and participants’ experiences with offi  cial sources of 
information.
As this model shows, decisions about the future for 
research participants are based on far more than the infor-
mation they get from offi  cial sources of information. Th ese 
decisions are also based on more than local knowledge net-
works. Rather they appear to be products of an interface 
between the two as processes aff ected by trust, notions of 
security, and an overall context of vulnerability. Reliance 
on experiential knowledge is not necessarily causally linked 
to the unavailability of offi  cial information as West and 
Wambugu suggest.74 Rather it takes place parallel to what 
happens with offi  cial information and each tends to infl u-
ence the other.
Conclusion
Despite an overarching organizational commitment to pro-
viding information about options for the future to displaced 
persons, a restrictive framework nevertheless emerges when 
the stability of administrative processes prevails over indi-
vidual forced migrant requests. Actual practices regarding 
information suggest an institutional desire to remain in 
control of the migratory process and it appears to assume 
that Iraqi forced migrants have no recourse to such infor-
mation through alternative means. Th e defensive posturing 
on the part of these agencies may be an important safeguard 
for agency staff , but in terms of information, research par-
ticipants have described how this reticence constructs an 
adversary relationship.
Despite this tendency, there is a proliferation of local 
knowledge exchanged transnationally. Th e study locates its 
lens at the nexus of lived experience and offi  cial informa-
tion, pointing to the ways in which Iraqi forced migrants 
may see their lived experience and that of other migrants 
turned into the objectifi ed information of institutions that 
regulate migration. At the same time, participants dem-
onstrate that they call upon a variety of resources that are 
available via transnational communication networks. Th ese 
networks provide the local knowledge of thousands of Iraqis 
whose lived experiences constitute migratory capital for 
those forced migrants attempting to make a decision about 
where to go. While participants will likely always depend 
on their networks for experiential knowledge, current and 
projected insecurity clearly has an impact on how they see 
this knowledge and how they put it into dialogue with their 
perceptions of state and supra-state agencies. As humani-
tarian agencies restrict the fl ow of offi  cial information, they 
are unwittingly engaging both forced migrants’ senses of 
insecurity and their reliance on transnational networks. 
Th e attention to trust and security in this paper should 
guide subsequent work to look at the experiences of dis-
placed Iraqi women regarding access to offi  cial information 
and local knowledge networks. Women forced migrants as 
a category experience a higher level of violence and vulner-
ability,75 a point Nasrallah and Washington underscore in 
their report on Iraqi women in Syria who are sold into or 
who engage in sex work.76
Th is study has pointed to an understudied component 
of displacement, mobility, and the management of migrat-
ing groups. A transnational focus on the migratory capital 
of research participants brings greater clarity to how Iraqi 
forced migrants build and maintain social networks with 
one another.77 As Van Hear states, the challenge for agen-
cies like UNHCR is to reconcile their mandate and ways 
of working “with recognition that transnational connec-
tions and practices provide important means for sustaining 
people caught up in confl ict, displacement, and its aft er-
math.”78 Th us, the study aims to highlight the value of sup-
porting initiatives contributing to migratory capital, a set 
of resources on which forced migrants oft en depend just as 
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much as they rely on the protection of international agen-
cies. Rather than relying on a model of universal protocol, 
UNHCR and other agencies should both increase their 
transparency vis-à-vis the refugee and engage the sorts of 
local and transnational initiatives that spring up as survival 
mechanisms in contexts of displacement. Th e failure to do 
either will only aggravate the unintended consequences of 
humanitarian interventions instead of consolidating greater 
regulatory power for the international refugee regime over 
the forced migrant population.
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